Unpacking the EU’s Overlooked Military Mission in Mozambique: A Battle for Security, Investment, and Resources

The European Union’s military engagement across Africa is widely recognized, particularly in West Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, South Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. These efforts often draw the attention of activists, politicians, and the media. However, one key mission in Africa, which began in 2021, has gone largely unnoticed by the global public: the “EU Training Mission in Mozambique” (EUTM-Mozambique). This mission, aimed at strengthening the Mozambican army to tackle a violent insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, was recently extended and expanded as of September 1, 2024. But what exactly is happening in Mozambique, and why has the EU chosen to extend its involvement? This article delves into the roots of the conflict, the EU’s role, and the broader geopolitical implications. The Conflict in Cabo Delgado Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado has been mired in a violent conflict since October 2017, when Islamist groups launched attacks on police stations. The situation has escalated since, becoming a major threat to the region’s stability. Unlike other conflict zones in Africa, the Cabo Delgado crisis has not received widespread international attention. The conflict is multifaceted, with deep-rooted causes ranging from religious radicalization to ethnic tensions and economic marginalization. During Portuguese colonial rule and after Mozambican independence, the northern region, including Cabo Delgado, was largely neglected. This has continued for decades, leaving the region isolated from the political center in southern Mozambique. The discovery of natural gas reserves in recent years, however, has brought Cabo Delgado into the spotlight for international business, with major corporations like TotalEnergy, ExxonMobil, and ENI seeking to exploit these lucrative resources. The Economic and Social Drivers of Violence The conflict in Cabo Delgado is not solely driven by Islamist extremism. It is exacerbated by economic factors, including the marginalization of local communities and the displacements caused by large-scale natural resource extraction. These local populations have long felt excluded from the benefits of Mozambique’s economic development, and the discovery of gas has only deepened these inequalities. The fear of further displacement and marginalization has fueled resentment and contributed to the violence. In July 2021, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) launched the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), deploying troops from several African nations to help combat the Islamist insurgents. However, many of these countries have recently withdrawn their troops, citing either a lack of funding or claims that SAMIM had achieved its objective of pushing back the insurgents. Nonetheless, with the insurgency continuing to escalate in 2024, it is clear that the situation is far from resolved. Rwanda’s Role and Regional Geopolitics The deployment of Rwandan troops to Cabo Delgado has added another layer of complexity to the conflict. Rwanda, under President Paul Kagame’s authoritarian regime, has been increasingly positioning itself as a security provider in Africa, offering its military services in exchange for economic and political favors. France has likely facilitated Rwanda’s involvement to protect its interests, particularly TotalEnergy’s investments in the region. Rwandan companies have reportedly benefited from contracts related to securing and developing infrastructure for these natural gas projects. Kagame’s motivations extend beyond financial gain. Rwanda has its sights on increasing its geopolitical influence in southern and eastern Africa. Some critics suggest that Kagame’s involvement in Mozambique is an attempt to deflect attention from Rwanda’s controversial role in the ongoing war in eastern Congo. Rwanda’s government also appears to be using the conflict as a way to secure the Mozambican authorities’ cooperation in monitoring and extraditing Rwandan dissidents living in exile. In February 2024, the Mozambican parliament ratified an extradition agreement with Rwanda, raising fears among human rights groups that Rwandan dissidents could be targeted under this arrangement. The EU’s Role: From Training to Military Assistance Amidst this complex and volatile landscape, the European Union launched its training mission, EUTM Mozambique, in 2021. Initially intended to last for two years, the mission focused on training and supporting Mozambique’s armed forces, particularly in developing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to address the insurgency. However, this mission lacked an executive mandate, limiting its direct involvement in combat operations. Despite these limitations, the EU has provided substantial financial support to Mozambique’s military, channeling funds through the European Peace Facility (EPF). In 2022, an additional €45 million was allocated to the mission, bringing the total EU contribution to over €89 million. The EPF also helped supply the Mozambican forces with non-lethal equipment to support their efforts against the insurgents. The training mission included contributions from a variety of EU member states, with Portugal and France leading the charge. Notably, even non-EU nations like Serbia and Cape Verde have sent individual soldiers to participate in the mission. A Shift in Strategy: From Training to Military Assistance In early 2024, the Mozambican government formally requested an extension of the EU mission, and in July, the EU Council agreed to extend the mandate until July 2026. With this extension came a significant shift in the mission’s objectives: the EU would move from a focus on training to a broader role of “military assistance.” This reflects the evolving nature of the conflict, which now demands more direct support in addition to capacity building. Under the rebranded “EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique” (EUMAM Mozambique), the EU has committed an additional €14 million to continue its operations. However, Mozambique’s repeated requests for military hardware have so far been denied by Brussels, though the debate over arms deliveries continues. The European Peace Facility and Mozambique’s Future The EU’s engagement in Mozambique is part of its broader security strategy, known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This framework has been strengthened by the EU’s “Strategic Compass” from 2022, which emphasizes the need for Europe to act as a global security provider. The European Peace Facility plays a critical role in financing these security operations, circumventing existing EU treaties that prohibit the use of the EU budget for military purposes. The EPF has enabled the EU to bypass organizations like the African Union and directly fund military initiatives in countries like Mozambique. Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, has described the EPF as a tool that will make the EU a “more effective security provider worldwide.” However, there are growing concerns that this strategy could backfire, particularly in fragile states like Mozambique. By militarizing its foreign policy and focusing on military solutions to complex conflicts, the EU risks exacerbating existing tensions and fueling further violence. Although the Mozambican government’s requests for arms deliveries have been rejected, other regional actors—like Rwanda—have benefited from EU support, further complicating the geopolitical landscape. A Lack of Critical Assessment What remains lacking is a critical evaluation of the training mission’s success thus far. While the EU has trained over 1,700 soldiers, there is little evidence to suggest that this has significantly improved the security situation in Cabo Delgado. Reports from organizations like the International Crisis Group indicate that Mozambique’s government has restricted the EU’s military trainers from accessing the region. Meanwhile, the insurgency continues to pose a serious threat. Moreover, the EU mission’s emphasis on security and military solutions has overshadowed the need for socio-economic measures that address the root causes of the conflict. Cabo Delgado’s marginalized communities require more than just military intervention; they need genuine development efforts that include them in Mozambique’s economic growth. Security, Investment, and Resources The EU’s mission in Mozambique must be viewed through the lens of three key factors: security, investment protection, and resource access. While the EU’s rhetoric often emphasizes a defensive stance, its actions suggest a more aggressive strategy aimed at securing Europe’s gas supplies and protecting foreign investments. The conflict in Cabo Delgado is about more than just defeating insurgents—it is about controlling the natural resources that have made the region a hotspot for international business. Moving forward, it is essential that the EU and the Mozambican government prioritize the well-being of local populations and create avenues for dialogue and conflict resolution. Without addressing the socio-economic drivers of violence, the conflict in Cabo Delgado is unlikely to end, and the EU risks becoming yet another external actor fueling the militarization of the region.